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The Essential Structure of
Judgment Proofing
Lynn M. LoPucki*
In order to insulate itself against debts resulting from unfavorable judgments, a business entity may seek to operate unencumbered by significant assets. In this essay, Professor Lynn LoPucki revisits this issue of 'judgment
proofing" and responds to arguments that large businesses cannot operate in
judgment-proof conditions. He identifies a single structure that describes virtually all judgment proofing: a division of risks of liability and assets into two or
more separate entities sharing a symbiotic relationship. An "operating entity"
conducts the business activities and carries the risks of tort liability, while an
"owning entity" owns the business assets. While the two entities are bound together by contract, the bifurcation of assets and risks shields the business from
judgment debt. Professor LoPucki argues that current law cannot collapse the
two entities into one for purposes of satisfying judgments, and concludes that
large businesses of any type can successfully render themselves judgment-proof

In The Judgment Proof Problem,' Steve Shavell demonstrated that
judgment-proof debtors have suboptimal incentives to exercise care or pur-

chase liability insurance. Such debtors will tend to impose above-optimal
levels of risk on third parties and to carry insufficient liability insurance.
Carried to its logical extreme, the "judgment-proof problem" is that judgment-proof debtors can commit torts with impunity.

The immediate implications of Shavell's 1986 observations were in the
fields of tort and insurance law. But concern about judgment-proof debtors
quickly spread to the fields of corporate and commercial law as scholars in
those fields recognized the broader implications of Shavell's analysis. The
revered institutions of corporate limited liability and secured credit were, in
Shavell's terms, judgment proofing. Whenever they mattered at all, they
generated the judgment-proof problem.
In response to the skewed incentives of judgment-proof debtors, corpo-

rate and commercial law scholars proposed drastic changes in established
doctrine. Those proposals included abolishing corporate limited liability,2
* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Corell Law School. The author acknowledges the intellectual contributions of Lucian Bebchuk, Frances Foster, Louis Kaplow, Joseph Weiler, and other
participants in the Harvard Law School workshop.
1. S. Shavell, The Judgment ProofProblem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
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granting tort creditors priority over secured creditors,3 and carving out a por
tion of secured creditors' collateral for the benefit of unsecured creditors.4

The most troubling critique of each such proposal was the same: debtorstrategists would be able to end run the reforms.5

In The Death of Liability,6 an article published ten years after The Judgment Proof Problem, I argued that the proposed reforms were futile. Not
only would adjustments to the liability system fail to restore mathematically
precise levels of deterrence,7 but judgment proofing would overwhelm and
destroy that system.8

A persistent objection to The Death of Liability thesis has been that large

businesses cannot practically operate in judgment-proof conditions.9 For
example, in his response to The Death of Liability, Professor James J. White

argues that lenders and other contract creditors force large businesses t
maintain substantial unencumbered equities on which tort creditors are able
to free-ride.'0 A broader version of the objection notes that unencumbered

cushions of equity serve a variety of functions within the large firm, some of

which are not yet well understood. No one has yet demonstrated that significant numbers of large firms can operate without cushions of equity.

The discussion of this objection has been hampered by the wide variety
of forms in which large businesses and judgment proofing exist. Demon
strating that firms of a particular variety can employ a particular device to
operate in judgment-proof condition does not necessarily prove that firms of
other varieties could do so. Attempts to discuss the objection typically dissipate into disputes over the practicality of employing a particular judgment-

for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1900, 1932-34 (1991) (summarizing possible arguments
in favor of abandoning corporate limited liability in order to realign incentives).

3. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887,
1891 (1994) (advocating priority for tort creditors over secured creditors); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1605 (1991) (same).

4. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 909-11 (1996) (discussing the possibility of a 25%
carve-out or "fixed fraction" for unsecured creditors); Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb

Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to the Council of the American Law Institute (Apr. 25,
1996) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (proposing a 20% carve-out for unsecured creditors).

5. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 392-405 (1992) (arguing that modem securities markets would
be able to nullify the effects of corporate unlimited or proportionate liability).

6. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1 (1996).
7. The "liability system" is the system by which courts enter and enforce judgments for
money damages.
8. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 6-7, 89-90 (describing the effect of judgment proofing on the
liability system).

9. See, e.g., James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's
The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1394-1412 (1998) (arguing that corporations face

significant barriers to judgment proofing).
10. See id. at 1396-97.
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proofing device in a particular industry. The problem is complicated by
almost complete lack of probative empirical evidence.1 As a result, the d
bate has been locked in the academic equivalent of door-to-door fighting.

As a means of overcoming that limitation, this essay argues that all,
substantially all, judgment proofing has a single essential structure: a sy
biotic relationship between two or more entities, in which one of the enti
generates disproportionately high risks of liability and another owns a d
proportionately high level of assets. Through the contract that unites th
the two entities allocate between them the gains from judgment proofing.

Typically, the asset-owning entity guarantees payment of selected co

tract obligations of the liability-generating entity (the "operating entity"
necessary for the latter to continue in business. This guarantee does not

compass the tort obligations of the operating entity. The guarantee may b
simple contract, or may be a regulated form such as a standby letter of cr
or payment insurance. In some cases, no guarantee may be issued. Thus, i

is possible to describe all, or substantially all, judgment-proofing mec
nisms, whether employed by large businesses, small businesses, or indivi

als, in a single model. This model makes it possible to identify the assum

tions necessary to prove that any business or individual can operate

judgment-proof condition.

This essay focuses on the application of this model in the context of

large firm because skepticism about the practicality of judgment proofing
focused on that context. In that context, proof of the model relies upon t
propositions. The first, argued in Part I, is that any large business can be d
vided into two components-one with the bulk of the tort liability, the oth
with the bulk of the assets and the contract liability-and the division can
accomplished without significant change in the operation of the business

The second, argued in Part II, is that the law cannot collapse the two part
into one because it cannot find a principle for inclusion; that is, it canno
separate the two parts from each other or from the business environmen

The essay concludes that large businesses of any type can operate in a jud
ment-proof condition.

I. SPLITTING BUSINESSES INTO ASSET-OWNING AND OPERATING ENTITI

Judgments are enforced only against assets owned by the judgme
debtor.12 To own no assets is to be judgment-proof. Some businesses
operate without owning assets of significant value.'3 For example, a b

11. Compare id. at 1368-93 (attempting to introduce empirical evidence into the debate), wit

Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1415-22 (19

(explaining why White's data is not probative).

12. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 8-13 (describing the operation of the liability system).

13. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 11, at 1420-24, 1430-32 (providing examples of busines
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ness may lease all of the assets used in its operations or may have gran
security interest in those assets to secure a debt in excess of the value of

assets. In either case, the debtor is judgment-proof in the sense tha

debtor has no assets from which the creditor can recover.

Others have argued, however, that it is impractical to operate a
business in such a posture.14 Efficiency requires that the business have

encumbered assets. Such a "cushion" of unencumbered assets is nece

to enable the business to meet its financial obligations during periods w

the business is not profitable. A business without unencumbered as
would be swamped-and bankrupted-by the slightest adversity.

Accepting for purposes of argument that such a cushion is necessar
does not follow that it is impossible to operate a large business in a
ment-proof condition. Though the business and the assets are both n
sary, they need not be contained in the same legal entity. The judg
proofer's solution to the problem described in the preceding paragraph

separate the business into two or more legal entities that continue in a sy
otic relationship. One of these entities, the "owning entity," owns the un
cumbered assets of the business. The other, the "operating entity," eng
in the potentially liability-generating activity.

Why does this separation defeat liability? In nearly every instance,
ability is generated by employees, but damages can only be collected fr
assets. Figure I shows that liability is initially a link between the tort vi

and the employee of the business. The doctrine of respondeat sup

transmits the liability to the employing (operating) entity. Once liability

been fixed against that entity, it can be collected from the assets owne
that entity. The weakness in the liability system is the lack of any gene
applicable requirement that operating entities own assets.15

owning minimal assets).

14. See, e.g., White, supra note 9, at 1394-1412 (describing numerous barriers to corp

judgment proofing).

15. Statutes require liability insurance or financial responsibility in some specific cir
stances. See id. at 1410 n. 175 (providing examples of such circumstances).
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FIGURE I
UNIFIED BUSINESS STRUCTURE

To complete the judgment-proof structure, the judgment proofer introduces a second entity to own the assets of the business. As shown in Figure
II, the two entities ordinarily are linked by contract. The contract performs
two functions. First, it welds the two entities into a single business and assures that the business will have full use of the resources of both entities to

the extent needed. Second, it insulates against liability. That is, the nature of
the contract is such that judgment creditors of the operating entity are not
legally entitled to recover their judgments from the assets of the owning entity.

FIGURE II

JUDGMENT-PROOF BUSINESS STRUCTURE
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Several different types of contracts are used in various judgment-

proofing schemes:

1. Lessor-lessee. To the extent that the assets of the business are real or

tangible personal property, they are placed in the owning entity and leased to
the operating entity.16 Judgment creditors of the lessee can take only the les
see's interest in the lease. If the rental is month-to-month at market rates, the
lessee's interest will be of negligible value.

2. Secured lender-borrower. Secured lenders have priority over the

judgments of tort creditors. When this type of contract is employed, the operating entity will hold title to the assets of the business, but the owning en
tity will have a security interest in the assets that secures a debt in an amount

roughly equal to the value of the assets. Again, the operating entity's interest
in the assets, and consequently, the value that judgment creditors can reach,
will be negligible.17

3. Buyer-seller. If the assets of the business are accounts receivable
generated by the operating entity, the contract will provide for sale of the
accounts to the owning entity as the accounts are generated.18 The arm'slength sale is for the full value of the receivables. The operating entity then
distributes the proceeds of the sale to its shareholders as dividends, before
incurring tort liability.

4. Franchisor-franchisee. To the extent that the assets of the business
are trademarks and business systems, the owner of those assets becomes the
franchisor and the users the franchisees. Courts generally hold that franchi-

sors are not liable for the torts of their franchisees.19

5. Licensor-licensee. Assets such as computer programs, trademarks,

and other intellectual property may be licensed from the owning entity to the
operating entity. Use of the licensor's trademark by the licensee does not
render the licensor liable for the torts of the licensee or leave the trademark

vulnerable to seizure for torts committed by an entity operating under its

banner.20

16. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 333-35, 340-42
(6th Cir. 1990) (involving use of lessor-lessee judgment proofing to defeat labor claims).
17. For an example of the use of this structure, see LoPucki, supra note 11, at 1423-24.
18. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 133 (1994) (describing asset securitization transactions).

19. See, e.g., O'Banner v. McDonald's Corp., 670 N.E.2d 632-35 (Ill. 1996) (holding that
McDonald's was not liable for slip and fall at franchisee's restaurant); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So.2d 119, 121-22 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Mobil Oil was not liable for assault by em-

ployee of franchisee).

20. See Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1222-24 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a

parent company was not liable for defective products manufactured and sold by its subsidiary under
the trademark of the parent company), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 55 (1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY ? 14 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
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6. Parent-subsidiary. The owning entity may own not only the as

used in the business, but also the stock of the operating entity. This struc
is the most convenient, because it justifies transfer of excess earnings of

operating entity to the owning entity as dividends. Theoretically, the par
subsidiary structure is vulnerable to a court's disregarding of the subsid

as a separate entity. In practice, courts rarely extend liability to a pa
company.21 As a result, parent-subsidiary is probably the most common
the contracts employed in judgment-proof structures.22

Because the owning and operating entities divide the unified busin

between them, the two entities together have all of the characteristics of

unified business. Together, they own the same assets, conduct the same
erations, employ the same people, and have the same creditworthiness. If
contractual relationship is other than a parent-subsidiary relationship, e
entity will issue stock to its owners. Together, the two stockholdings wil
the equivalent of the stock in the unified business,23 but with one impor

advantage: The bifurcated business will be judgment-proof. It will not h
to pay its tort liability.

No corporate constituent need be inconvenienced by the new structu
Finance theorists have pointed out that a business is merely a web of con
tracts among the various constituents-shareholders, creditors, employee
suppliers, customers, and others.24 In the judgment-proof structure, two
tities rather than one are involved. But that fact in no way restricts the
stituents in their contracting with one another. The only difference is on
form: In the unified business, the constituents contract with reference
single entity, whereas they contract with reference to two or more in t
judgment-proof business. In contracting with reference to the entities of

judgment-proof business, each constituent can obtain exactly the same rig
against other constituents that it would have obtained in a unified structu

For example, an employee can contract for his or her employment with
operating entity and obtain a guarantee of payment from both the owning
the operating entities. The constituent supplying the capital used to buy
sets will place them in the owning entity, which will lease them to the op
ating entity. Whatever return on investment the constituent would have

21. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil. An Empirical Study, 76 CORN
L. REV. 1036, 1058 (1991) (reporting that only 226 of the 1572 veil-piercing cases studied were t
cases, and that the court pierced the corporate veil in only 70 of those tort cases).

22. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 20-23 (discussing parent-subsidiary judgment proofing).

23. The shares in the two entities might or might not be in common ownership. If they ar
the likelihood that the two will be collapsed into one will be higher.

24. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (charact
izing firm as that range of exchanges in which resource allocation was accomplished by auth
and direction rather than through the market system). See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
tics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 681-82 (1995) (describing the
of "a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts" as the prevailing theory of the firm).
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tracted from a unified company, the constituent can extract from the operating company as "rent." The amount of that rent can be made to fluctuate
with the success or failure of the business, in whatever manner the parties
choose.25

Through a standby letter of credit, a loan, or a guarantee from the owner,

an effective "cushion of equity" can be made available to the operating entity
and its contract creditors without making it available to its tort creditors.26

For example, the owning entity might provide a line of credit through a
"blocked account" that would enable the operating entity to operate with absolutely no cash on hand.27 Or, the owning entity might guarantee various
contract debts of the operating entity in return for a fee linked to the revenues

or the profits of the operating entity. Persons contracting with the operating
entity would do so in reliance on the financial strength of the owning entity.
Alternatively, the owning entity might contract with third parties for the resources needed in the business and lease them to the operating entity. Either
way, the contract creditors have full recourse and the tort creditors none.

Of course, the owning entities must be compensated for their guarantees.
The simplest form of compensation is a fixed fee, as a bank would charge for

a standby letter of credit. More complex forms would tie the amount of
compensation to the revenues or profits of the operating company. An example would be a shopping center lease that links the rent payable for space
to the net sales of the lessee's business.28 At the extreme, the owning company might provide all of the equity-most of it in the form of a guaranteein return for all of the profits. That is commonly the arrangement when a
parent company finances the business of its subsidiary.
By lending its credit to a judgment-proof operating entity, the owning
entity creates a moral hazard problem.29 Because the operating entity will
not suffer the loss if the guarantees are called upon, it will tend to rely recklessly on the guarantees. In order to protect itself, the owning entity could
own the stock of the operating entity and elect directors who would not act
opportunistically. But the owning entity can also achieve roughly equivalent
25. See, e.g., Harmont Plaza, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 632, 635 (1975) (describing lease
agreement providing for rent in an amount equal to 2.5% of tenant's net sales up to $8.5 million
plus 1.25% of the next $2 million, plus 1% of net sales over $10.5 million).
26. See, e.g., In re Iowa R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Collecting carriers with
shaky finances may be required to post bonds, secure letters of credit, or find other ways to assure
that they turn over [money they owe to others]. The economy teems with such devices.").

27. See, e.g., Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 761 F. Supp. 1010, 1020
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (describing a particular blocked account mechanism); LYNN M. LOPUCKI &
ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 261 (2d ed. 1998) (describing

blocked account mechanisms generally).

28. For an example of such a lease, see Harmont Plaza, Inc., 64 T.C. at 633-35.
29. For a general discussion of moral hazard, see Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing Moral Hazard,
1 CONN. INS. L.J. 97 (1995).

This content downloaded from
128.227.201.83 on Fri, 08 Jul 2022 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

November 1998]

JUDGMENT PROOFING

155

protection without formal legal control. The symbiotic relationship that ex
ists between truly independent owning and operating entities is held togethe
by three kinds of advantages. The first is the prospect for mutual gain tha
would have held all of the constituents of the unified business together, ha
the business not been split into owning and operating entities. That is, the
constituents will want to contract with the entities of the judgment-proof
business for the same reasons they would have wanted to contract with the
entity of the unified business. The second advantage is the continuing savings from externalizing the tort liability that the unified business would have
had. Working together, the entities of the judgment-proof business have the

same earning power as the unified business, but lower costs of liability

They can divide the savings between them by contract. The third advantage
is saving the transaction costs that would have to be incurred to redeploy th
assets and constituents of the business if the owning and operating entities
severed their relationship. So long as these advantages exceed the amounts
that the operating entity could capture from the owning entity through opportunism, the operating company has an incentive to cooperate with the
owning entity-even though the owning entity has no effective remedy by
suit for money damages. That incentive assures that even if the contractual
arrangement between the entities of the judgment proof business were sev
ered-for example, by the bankruptcy of the operating entity-the two entities would choose to recontract and continue their profitable partnership.

To minimize the amount the operating entity could capture through opportunism, the owning company would retain the right to terminate the relationship to the maximum extent consistent with the business needs of the

operating company. For example, the owning entity might extend guarantees
only to specific suppliers for specified times or retain the right to cancel
guarantees already given,30 which would give the owning entity substantial
leverage over the operating entity. This leverage would be similar in source
and effect to the leverage that bank lenders commonly seek over their bor
rowers in the absence of bankruptcy.31 The owning entity, like a bank, could
use its leverage to maintain access to the books, records, and operations of
the operating entity. Through that access, the owning entity could discover

opportunistic activity at its inception and prevent its maturation. That
30. See, e.g., In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc., 161 B.R. 107, 111-13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)

(involving a bank's letter of credit to debtor's suppliers that provided for cancellation by the bank at
any time by notice to the suppliers).

31. See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1358
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a bank need not "loan more money or give more advance notice of

termination than its contract requires"); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 754 (6th Cir.
1985) (involving a $3.5 million line of credit with the repayment of the balance due "on demand").
Debtors can often negate this kind of leverage by filing bankruptcy. But that is not true of leverage
that comes from an as-yet unperformed contract to extend credit. Such contracts are unenforceabl

in bankruptcy, even if enforceable outside bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. ? 365(c)(2) (1994).
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monitoring could assure that the operating entity would meet its obligations
to the owning entity even while predictably shirking its obligations to the tort
creditors.

II. THE IMPRACTICALITY OF COLLAPSING ENTITIES

In the example used in the previous Part, the two halves of the bifurcated
business were created by dividing the previously unified business. Thus, it
might seem easy for the courts to collapse the two entities into one at the request of an aggrieved tort creditor. But creation of the owning and operating
entities by division in that example was merely to illustrate that the two parts
could constitute a working whole. The cooperating entities could also form
independently of each other-separate sets of investors, brought together by
investment bankers or brokers to contract at arm's length.32 The investors in
each of the entities would regard their own business-owner or operator-as
complete in itself and merely in a contractual relationship with the other. On
what principle could a court collapse the two into one?

The principle most often suggested is "enterprise." That is, the court
should determine the scope of the business enterprise and collapse all of the
"constituent parts . . . functioning as an integral part of a united endeavor"
into one.33 The problem with that approach is that the boundaries of the
modem enterprise are ethereal and transitory.34 This is particularly true with
regard to whether assets are owned by the enterprise, and therefore "inside"
it, or leased by the enterprise, and therefore "outside" it. This distinction
means everything to the judgment creditor, who can recover only from the
assets of its judgment debtor. Yet to the promoter who sets up the potential
judgment debtor's business, the decision to own the assets or lease them may
be of very little consequence. Some airlines raise additional capital to own
their aircraft, others lease them. The same is true of factories, offices, and

stores. Subtle changes in the business environment can quickly alter the
pattern.35 One such change may be the perception that liability constitutes a
significant threat to the business.
32. For an example of such an arm's-length relationship between owning and operating entities, see the discussion of Rockefeller Center Properties, in text accompanying note 47 infra.

33. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS IN THE
BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTEES ? 1.03 at 10 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) ("The private
corporation or firm is simply one form of legalfiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships .... [I]t makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are 'inside' the
firm (or any other organization) from those things that are 'outside' of it.").

35. See, e.g., Neal Templin, Building Tension: REIT Revolution Hits an Unexpected Bump:
Opposition by Clinton, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1998, at Al (describing boom in Real Estate Investment Trusts, or REITs, resulting from change in tax laws combined with an innovative business
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The boundaries of the modem business enterprise are also ethereal and

transitory with regard to employees and operations.36 Workers may be "i
side" the business as employees, bringing the potential tort liability for th
error and omissions with them. But the same tasks may be performed by

independent contractors, who are "outside" the business, though they look
suspiciously like employees and may even be former employees. This gam
is not played solely at the lower levels of the enterprise. Businesses of

sizes occasionally contract to be managed by a separate entity-a manag

ment company-rather than hire executives as employees.37 Businesses may
"outsource" other functions that traditionally were part of the enterprise, i

cluding bookkeeping, sales, marketing, finance, and even manufacturing.
may now be possible for a business to outsource all functions at the sa
time, a concept sometimes referred to as a "virtual company."38

To illustrate the problem a court would face in determining the bound
ries of an enterprise without reference to its form, consider the example of
$80 million judgment for food poisoning at a hypothetical fast-food resta
rant franchise. The negligent employees were employed by Franchisee, In
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, that corporation is liable, but

owns nothing. The land and building are owned by and leased from a Real
Estate Investment Trust (REIT) that owns hundreds of such properties. Th
equipment in the restaurant is owned by and leased from a national leasin
company. The trademark and business systems are owned by the franchis
Franchisor, Inc. The franchise agreement provides that the franchise is n

property and that Franchisor, Inc. can cancel it at any time, with or witho
cause.

For a court to identify the boundaries of the business in this ill
may be impossible. Reliance on the legal form of the transactions
result that the franchisee's enterprise has no assets. Holding the f
enterprise to own all assets indispensable to the business adds noth
gardless of the type of asset considered, some businesses operat

owing it, or at least without having any equity in it. For exam

businesses lease the real estate they occupy and the equipment the
decision to include in the enterprise all of the assets used in th
would create more problems than it would solve. For instance, airp
used in the businesses of airlines, but no one advocates permitting

strategy).

36. See, e.g., David Chamy, The Scope of the Firm and Efficient Regulation of Employment
Contracts (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review) (describing uncertainties of firm boundaries).

37. See, e.g., Preferred Physicians Mutual Management Group v. Preferred Physicians Mutual

Risk Retention, 918 S.W.2d 805, 807-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (involving management company
operating an insurance company).

38. See LoPucki, supra note 11, at 1433-34 (describing "virtual judgment proofing").
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creditors of a bankrupt airline to levy on those airports and collect fro
them. One may be tempted to say that the airport is outside the enterpris
because it is used by several businesses. Yet to limit the "enterprise" to assets used exclusively by the business would give up too much. Under th

regime, the debtor could shield assets, such as its aircraft, simply by sharin
use with another airline.

Nor is it clear in the illustration under discussion what "enterprise" we
are talking about. Is it the local franchise or the national chain? If the enter

prise is the national chain, shouldn't it also include all firms,39 regardless
separate ownership, whose entire business is supplying goods or services to
the chain? An affirmative answer to this question would expose thousands
of suppliers to liability that they do not have under current law.

The search for the boundaries of the "enterprise" will fail.40 It is an ef
fort to distinguish the substance of a business organization from its form, b
in substance there are no sharp boundaries among businesses. Firms in inde
pendent ownership link to one another through formal contract, informal
business relationship, or some combination of the two. The firms themselve

are often composed of numerous legal entities which may be completely or
partially owned by one another. These contractual webs extend throughout
the economy. To hold the entity that commits the tort and all contractual
related entities liable would be to hold the entire American economy liable.

As strategists have manipulated the flexible boundaries of firms and en
terprises, those firms and enterprises have tended to bifurcate into ownin

and operating entities. Whether the bifurcation results from judgmen

proofing, tax avoidance, regulatory evasion, or considerations of economic
efficiency, the effect is the same. After bifurcation, operating entities have
fewer assets available to satisfy the same or greater liability.

Consider, for example, the recent boom in REITs. REITs raise money in
public markets and use it to buy hospitals, manufacturing facilities, car deal
erships, office buildings, and other revenue-generating real property.41 Th
REIT buys only the real estate, not the business. Typically, it leases the rea
estate back to the "operating company." (In our terminology, the REIT is the

owning entity.) A recent article in the Wall Street Journal carried a predic
tion that in ten years REITs would have $1.3 trillion dollars in assets-50
of the investment-grade real estate in the United States. The same artic
quoted the CEO of a REIT boasting that he could "buy a company like
McDonald's [Corporation], put the real estate in the REIT, and use the oper-

39. The distinction between a "firm" and an "enterprise" as I use the terms here is that a
"firm" is owned by a single set of investors and managed by a single person or group. An "ente
prise" may consist of two or more firms joined by contract in a single business endeavor.

40. See note 34 supra.
41. See Templin, supra note 35.
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ating corporation to run the restaurant chain."42 The article describes the
boom in REITs as tax-motivated and does not mention liability. But the re
sult is judgment proofing.43

Asset securitization, one of the fastest growing segments of the U

capital markets,44 provides a second example of this growing bifurcation.
an asset securitization transaction, a company sells its accounts receivables

a "bankruptcy-remote vehicle"-a corporation or trust set up for the s

purpose of buying the receivables with money raised from public investo
Interestingly, the charters of these bankruptcy-remote vehicles provide th
they can own things, but cannot do anything except hold title for the inve
tors. The effect of an asset securitization is to remove from the operatin
company one of its principal assets, its accounts receivable. The profession
als engaged in these transactions insist simultaneously that (1) the transac
tions are not motivated by a desire to reduce the assets available to credit
of the operating company,45 and (2) it is critical to the asset securitizatio
transaction that the buyer's interest in the receivables cannot be disturbed
a later bankruptcy of the operating company.46

I previously reported the curious bifurcation of the ownership of Rocke
feller Center prior to its bankruptcy in 1994.47 The real property was own
and operated by two partnerships ("Rockefeller Center Properties") which
were in turn owned by corporations owned by the Rockefeller family and

Mitsubishi interests. Rockefeller Center Properties-formally the tit

holders but in our terminology the operating entities-were judgment-pro
because the real property, worth about $1.3 billion, was encumbered b

mortgage in approximately the same amount. The mortgage lender w
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc., a public company whose sole busin

was the making of this loan. Together, the lender and borrower were wor

$1.3 billion, but their legal structure divided them into a judgment-proof o
erating company and a liability-free mortgage holder.

42. Id.

43. For a discussion of the appropriate definition of "judgment proofing," compare LoPucki
supra note 11, at 1421-22, with White, supra note 9, at 1363 n.2.
44. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 24 (describing the growth of asset securitization).
45. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 146-51 (arguing that asset securitization transactions
reduce net financing costs without harming unsecured creditors).

46. See id. at 135 ("The [securitization transaction], however, must be structured as 'bankruptcy remote' to gain acceptance as an issuer of capital market securities.").
47. See LoPucki, supra note 11, at 1423-24 (describing the prebankruptcy ownership structure
of Rockefeller Center).
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CONCLUSION

The bifurcation of large businesses into asset-owning companies and operating companies may or may not be motivated in significant part by a conscious intention to become judgment-proof. That matters little, because the
effect of bifurcation is to reduce the aggregate value of the assets exposed to
liability. That is the very essence of judgment proofing.
The model of the bifurcated enterprise presented in this essay is designed
to illuminate the practical problems of judgment proofing large businesses.
But the structure thus exposed-an entity engaged in liability-generating activity without assets of its own, in symbiotic relationship with an assetowning entity that often selectively guarantees the operating entity's nontort
debt is familiar. It is the basic structure of all judgment proofing, including
that of small businesses and individuals. The crudest form of individual

judgment proofing, in which one spouse owns the assets while the other incurs the judgments, is giving way to a more sophisticated form in which a
self-settled spendthrift trust owns the assets while the settlor incurs the

judgments.48 Among small businesses the forms have remained relatively
stable. The two most common are (1) a corporation engaged in risky business with minimal assets, owned by wealthy individuals who assist by guaranteeing selected debts,49 and (2) a corporation or individual engaged in risky
business with assets fully encumbered to a bank or other arm's-length investor who incurs no tort liability.50 In each of these examples, owning and
operating entities are clearly distinguishable.
The essential structure of judgment proofing, two entities in a symbiotic
relationship, reveals its resilience. The liability-prone entity will tend to specialize in activity that risks tort liability while its "partner" will tend to specialize in the safekeeping of assets. Seeking to discover and root out these

symbiotic relationships one by one in litigation is, for the law, a hopeless
task.51 Symbiotic business relationships are ubiquitous; they are the fabric of
which an economy is made.

48. See generally Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake
and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (1994) (describing such an arrangement).
49. See, e.g., Brooks v. Networks of Chattanooga, Inc., 946 S.W.2d 321, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1996) (involving shareholder guaranteeing a corporation's lease).
gies).

50. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 14-19 (describing secured debt judgment-proofing strate51. Elsewhere, I have discussed an alternative response-requiring financial responsibility of

every entity as a condition of participation in the economy-and concluded that it solves the problem to only a limited degree. See id. at 78-89; LoPucki, supra note 11, at 1432-33.
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